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Bombs	  that	  Make	  No	  Noise	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  
Kenneth	  Bush1	  	  
	  
One	  evening	  in	  August	  1991,	  I	  was	  preparing	  for	  a	  meeting	  the	  next	  morning	  in	  Bryson	  
House	  on	  Bedford	  Street.	  	  In	  the	  early	  morning	  hours,	  I	  heard	  what	  many	  in	  Belfast	  would	  
have	  heard	  before:	  the	  ominous	  thud	  and	  rumble	  of	  an	  explosion	  somewhere	  in	  the	  city.	  	  
Stepping	  out	  into	  the	  cool	  night	  air,	  I	  scanned	  the	  sky,	  listening	  for	  the	  unlit	  helicopters	  that	  
would	  offer	  clues	  about	  the	  location	  of	  the	  blast	  site.	  	  Not	  long	  afterwards,	  there	  was	  a	  
second	  explosion.	  	  	  
	  
In	  those	  days,	  the	  bombings,	  the	  murders,	  and	  the	  shootings	  made	  a	  lot	  of	  noise.	  	  They	  sent	  
political	  sound	  waves	  through	  the	  minds	  of	  people,	  through	  the	  local	  and	  international	  
media,	  through	  public	  discourse,	  and	  through	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  lives	  of	  ordinary	  people.	  More	  
that	  16,000	  bombs	  shrapnelled	  the	  lives	  of	  long-­‐suffering	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  pugnaciously	  resilient	  -­‐-­‐	  
children,	  women,	  and	  men	  of	  Northern	  Ireland	  and	  the	  border	  region.	  	  When	  you	  further	  
consider	  the	  countless	  “non-­‐viable	  devices,”	  defused	  bombs,	  and	  hoaxes,	  the	  total	  number	  
of	  bomb-­‐related	  events	  ripples	  upwards	  like	  a	  departures/arrivals	  board	  in	  an	  old	  train	  
station.	  
	  
Twenty	  years	  later,	  the	  bombs	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  don’t	  sound	  the	  same.	  	  Indeed,	  they	  don’t	  
seem	  to	  make	  much	  of	  a	  noise	  at	  all.	  Not	  even	  in	  the	  places	  where	  they	  once	  had	  such	  useful	  
concussive	  resonance	  –	  within	  the	  media,	  university,	  and	  policy-­‐making	  circles.	  	  But	  perhaps,	  
it	  is	  just	  my	  advancing	  years.	  	  Maybe	  I	  don’t	  hear	  as	  well	  as	  I	  used	  to.	  	  So,	  I	  decided	  to	  test	  
my	  political	  hearing	  by	  polling	  those	  with	  a	  longer-­‐term	  perspective	  than	  mine,	  regarding	  
this	  unscientific	  observation	  about	  bombs	  that	  make	  no	  noise.	  	  Not	  surprisingly,	  a	  range	  of	  
hypotheses	  tumbled	  out	  of	  these	  conversations.	  	  While	  these	  are	  discussed	  below,	  	  the	  
obvious	  point	  needs	  stating:	  bombers	  just	  have	  to	  “get	  lucky”	  once	  to	  create	  an	  Omagh-­‐style	  
atrocity.	  	  But,	  if	  this	  was	  to	  happen,	  the	  current	  question	  of	  silence	  would	  be	  no	  less	  
perplexing.	  
	  
The	  Petrol	  Hypothesis:	  	  that	  the	  very	  mention	  of	  such	  things	  may	  generate/	  exacerbate	  
tensions	  between	  still-­‐divided	  communities,	  leading	  to	  an	  exceptionally	  loud	  silence	  -­‐-­‐	  the	  
kind	  of	  silence	  that	  smells	  like	  gasoline,	  and	  that	  may	  combust	  with	  one	  lit	  word-­‐match.	  	  	  
However,	  this	  hypothesis	  was	  quickly	  dismissed	  as	  Jurassic.	  	  It	  may	  have	  been	  plausible	  (and	  
testable)	  once	  upon	  a	  time	  in	  the	  tentative	  and	  tenuous	  early	  stages	  of	  a	  post-­‐Agreement	  
world.	  	  But	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  present,	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  less	  than	  plausible.	  
	  
The	  Deafness	  Hypothesis:	  that,	  after	  all	  these	  years	  of	  intimate	  violence,	  no	  one	  wants	  to	  
hear	  it	  any	  more,	  resulting	  in	  a	  self-­‐induced	  deafness.	  	  This	  was	  a	  phenomenon	  studied	  
during	  the	  dirty	  wars	  of	  Latin	  America	  -­‐-­‐	  a	  time	  of	  authoritarianism,	  systemic	  human	  rights	  
abuses,	  and	  terror.	  	  	  At	  first,	  the	  deafness	  was	  convenient	  as	  a	  means	  of	  self-­‐preservation.	  	  
Then	  it	  became	  a	  habit.	  	  Then	  it	  became	  part	  of	  the	  culture	  of	  fear.	  	  But	  Northern	  Ireland	  
today,	  is	  not	  a	  time	  of	  terror.	  	  It	  is	  advertized	  by	  Stormont,	  White	  Hall,	  and	  the	  White	  House	  
March/April	  2011	  NO	  475	  
Bombs	  that	  Make	  No	  Noise	  
Kenneth	  Bush 




as	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  success	  story	  with	  lessons	  to	  be	  dispensed	  to	  delegations	  from	  warm	  war	  
zones	  around	  the	  world.	  	  If	  there	  is	  deafness	  here,	  its	  causes	  must	  be	  different	  from	  those	  in	  
Latin	  America.	  	  It	  may	  be	  however,	  that	  this	  is	  less	  a	  case	  of	  deafness,	  than	  the	  inconvenient	  
story	  hypothesis,	  where	  those	  stories	  that	  do	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  official	  meta-­‐narrative	  of	  
reconciliation	  and	  integration	  are	  muted	  or	  ignored	  –	  whether	  it	  is	  post-­‐Apartheid	  South	  
Africa	  or	  post-­‐colonial	  policies	  concerning	  indigenous	  peoples.	  
	  
The	  Dehumanization	  Hypothesis:	  that	  protracted	  exposure	  to	  political	  violence	  has	  had	  a	  
dehumanizing	  societal	  impact.	  	  Consequently,	  no	  one	  much	  cares	  about	  anyone	  else’s	  
suffering	  anymore.	  	  The	  most	  cynical	  among	  those	  with	  whom	  I	  spoke	  added,	  “except	  if	  the	  
suffering	  can	  be	  commodified	  and	  marketed	  for	  project	  funding.”	  	  This	  hypothesis	  raises	  two	  
uncomfortable	  observations.	  	  The	  first	  is	  a	  historical	  comparison.	  	  	  In	  the	  bad	  old	  days,	  
reaction	  in	  Britain	  was	  not	  especially	  vociferous	  if	  another	  bomb	  went	  off	  in	  Northern	  
Ireland,	  provided	  it	  did	  not	  result	  in	  the	  or	  injury	  of	  British	  security	  forces	  (This,	  of	  course,	  
eventually	  led	  the	  bombers	  to	  re-­‐sight	  the	  geographical	  targets	  of	  their	  terror	  campaign).	  In	  
the	  same	  way,	  in	  the	  good	  new	  days	  of	  the	  present,	  as	  one	  ex-­‐policeman	  put	  it,	  “someone	  in	  
Bangor	  doesn’t	  care	  if	  a	  bomb	  goes	  off	  in	  Derry	  or	  Armagh.”	  	  Has	  Britain’s	  disregard	  of	  
suffering	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  been	  internalized	  and	  indigenized	  in	  this	  “post-­‐conflict”	  world?	  	  
	  
The	  second	  observation	  concerns	  the	  danger	  of	  commodifying	  suffering	  that	  comes	  with	  the	  
influx	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  monies	  –	  or	  indeed,	  post-­‐disaster	  monies	  more	  generally	  as	  was	  
evident	  following	  the	  tsunami	  of	  December	  2004.	  	  It	  is	  mind-­‐boggling	  to	  consider	  that	  
Northern	  Ireland	  has	  received	  more	  peace	  and	  reconstruction	  funds	  per	  capita,	  than	  all	  of	  
Europe	  under	  the	  Marshall	  Plan	  for	  post-­‐WWII	  reconstruction.	  	  One	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  
these	  funds	  has	  been	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “Victims	  Sector”	  where	  the	  orientation	  of	  purpose-­‐
built,	  professional,	  victims	  organizations	  may	  be	  more	  heavily	  weighted	  towards	  fund-­‐raising	  
and	  grant-­‐writing	  than	  their	  (now-­‐labeled)	  ‘clients.’	  	  Putting	  the	  lie	  to	  this	  gross	  assertion	  
would	  require	  independent	  and	  systematic	  evaluation	  of	  these,	  and	  all,	  donor-­‐funded	  
initiatives.	  	  	  However,	  with	  logic-­‐defying	  chutzpah,	  evaluation	  funds	  for	  such	  initiatives	  
funded	  under	  the	  PEACE	  III	  programme	  have	  been	  cut	  in	  these	  “times	  of	  austerity”	  with	  the	  
argument	  that	  the	  use	  of	  funds	  for	  evaluation	  would	  not	  constitute	  “value	  for	  money.”	  
	  
The	  Hyper-­‐Compartmentalization	  Hypothesis:	  that	  Northern	  Ireland	  has	  become	  so	  
compartmentalized	  that	  a	  bomb	  blowing	  up	  out	  of	  ear	  shot,	  doesn’t	  send	  a	  ripple	  across	  a	  
cappuccino	  somewhere	  else	  in	  Northern	  Ireland.	  	  Even	  the	  discovery	  of	  a	  pipe	  bomb	  in	  the	  
playground	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  town	  doesn’t	  make	  much	  noise.	  	  Life	  has	  become	  modern:	  
modular	  and	  insular.	  A	  globalised	  consumerist	  culture	  exercises	  more	  influence	  on	  daily	  lives	  
than	  the	  atavistic	  divisions	  of	  the	  past.	  	  
	  
The	  Acceptable	  Levels	  of	  Violence	  Hypothesis	  (or	  “Scale”)	  Hypotheses:	  	  that	  the	  current	  
level	  of	  violence	  is	  nowhere	  near	  what	  it	  was	  in	  the	  dark	  days	  of	  The	  Troubles,	  and	  therefore	  
does	  not	  bludgeon	  its	  way	  into	  public	  consciousness.	  	  The	  phrase,	  “acceptable	  level	  of	  
violence,”	  originated	  in,	  and	  characterized,	  the	  sentiment	  of	  some	  British	  politicians	  during	  
the	  Troubles.	  	  (It	  is	  attributed	  to	  Home	  Secretary	  for	  Northern	  Ireland,	  Reginald	  Maudling).	  	  
However,	  the	  same	  sentiment	  may	  still	  hold	  true	  today	  	  -­‐-­‐	  only	  at	  an	  internalized	  societal	  
level	  within	  NI.	  
	  
The	  raw	  volume	  of	  murder	  and	  destruction	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  is	  low	  –	  not	  that	  this	  in	  any	  
way	  diminishes	  the	  human	  devastation	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  those	  ravaged	  by	  the	  violence	  of	  
today.	  	  But	  while	  the	  bombs	  of	  today	  are	  high	  on	  the	  irritation	  and	  inconvenience	  scale	  
(something	  familiar	  to	  motorists	  on	  Belfast’s	  Westlink,	  and	  Newry’s	  A1),	  they	  are	  low	  on	  the	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carnage	  scale.	  	  	  As	  to	  why	  this	  is	  so,	  according	  to	  one	  community-­‐based	  colleague,	  “the	  
general	  view	  is	  that	  the	  “	  ’unreconstructeds’	  lack	  the	  gear,	  the	  organisation,	  the	  
international	  connections,	  the	  leadership,	  and	  the	  popular	  support	  to	  do	  too	  much	  
damage.”	  	  	  Most	  importantly,	  such	  actions	  do	  not	  provoke	  paramilitary	  responses	  from	  
across	  the	  sectarian	  divides.	  However,	  within	  and	  across	  all	  communities,	  they	  do	  elicit	  the	  
uniform	  response	  of	  revulsion.	  	  	  The	  sectarian	  fault	  lines	  that	  might	  once	  have	  been	  
disturbed	  by	  such	  attacks	  do	  not	  erupt	  in	  seismic	  destruction.	  	  If	  this	  is	  so,	  then	  this	  
hypothesis	  may	  have	  as	  much	  to	  do	  with	  fundamental	  changes	  in	  societal	  attitudes	  as	  with	  
tolerance	  levels.	  
	  
Listening	  to	  Noiselessness	  	  
	  
How	  do	  you	  explain	  something	  that	  did	  not	  happen;	  a	  reaction	  that	  did	  not	  occur?	  	  	  If	  
indeed,	  bombs	  are	  being	  muted,	  then	  what	  has	  changed	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  today	  that	  
accounts	  for	  this	  noiselessness?	  	  Is	  that	  change	  permanent?	  	  Should	  it	  be	  welcomed?	  	  Such	  
are	  the	  questions	  riddling	  our	  understanding	  of	  this	  particular	  phenomenon.	  	  	  
	  
What	  if,	  tomorrow,	  the	  “unreconstucteds”	  succeeded	  in	  detonating	  “a	  spectacular,”	  causing	  
wide-­‐spread	  carnage?	  	  	  Would	  the	  arguments	  here	  be	  consigned	  conveniently	  to	  the	  dust	  
bin?	  	  Possibly.	  	  But,	  noiseless	  bombs	  should	  force	  us	  to	  look	  critically	  at	  ourselves.	  	  And,	  
when	  I	  repositioned	  myself	  onto	  that	  shiney	  academic	  perch,	  high	  above	  the	  smell	  and	  dust	  
of	  the	  post-­‐blast	  detrius,	  I	  would	  have	  to	  ask:	  was	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  noiseless	  bombs	  
related	  to	  the	  subsequent,	  unignorable,	  atrocity?	  	  Perhaps	  the	  present	  is	  precisely	  the	  time	  
to	  examine	  and	  address	  these	  bombs	  that	  make	  no	  noise	  –	  before	  the	  situation	  tilts	  
precipitously	  from	  the	  smugness	  side,	  to	  the	  panic	  side,	  of	  the	  political	  continuum.	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